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Abstract
In Part I, this Article surveys the evolution of crimes against humanity. This part reviews
interpretations of crimes against humanity by post-World War II tribunals, national courts, and
the International Law Commission (”ILC”). Part II examines the formulation of crimes against
humanity in the statutes that established the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yu-
goslavia (”ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (”ICTR”). It also looks at
how the reports issued in connection with the ICTY statute and the case law from the ICTY dealt
with crimes against humanity. Part III draws some preliminary conclusions regarding the status
of crimes against humanity in international law in the period directly preceding the Rome Confer-
ence and analyzes the relative authority of the various sources of law discussed in Parts I and II.
In Part IV, this Article surveys the issues raised by government delegates regarding crimes against
humanity during the negotiations on the draft statute for an ICC from 1994 to 1998. Finally, Part
V examines the debates on crimes against humanity that took place during the Rome Conference
and analyzes the definition of crimes against humanity adopted in the Rome Statute.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals at the end of
World War 1I, the promise of ending impunity for egregious vio-
lations of human rights and humanitarian law has remained un-
fulfilled for the past half century. As a result, individuals who
have transformed previously unimaginable atrocities into recur-
ring news headlines have escaped justice for their crimes. On
July 17, 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court ("Rome Conference") adopted the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute").' The In-
ternational Criminal Court ("ICC") will have jurisdiction over
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when na-
tional courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute such crimes.2
This Article examines the definition of crimes against humanity
in Article 7 of the Rome Statute3 and its consistency with con-
temporary international law. It confines its analysis to the open-
ing paragraph of the definition, the "chapeau," which sets out
the essential elements of crimes against humanity. Although Ar-
ticle 7 also contains significant developments regarding the enu-
merated acts that may constitute crimes against humanity, and
* B.A., Brown University; J.D., Columbia University. The author is currently coun-
sel at the Taiwan Association for Human Rights based in Taipei, Taiwan. She previously
served as counsel on the International Criminal Court campaign at Human Rights
Watch. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect the
views of either organization. The author is grateful for the valuable comments of Beth
Van Schaack. Comments may be directed to the author by e-mail at phyl-
lishwang@yahoo.com.
1. UNITED NATIONS, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTARIES ON THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF AN INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998) (adopted by United Nations on July 17, 1998)
(visited Dec. 22, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icc> [hereinafter ROME STATUTE].
2. Id. arts. 5, 12, 17 (setting forth crimes within jurisdiction of International Crimi-
nal Court ("ICC") in Article 5, preconditions to exercise of jurisdiction in Article 12,
and issues of admissibility in Article 17).
3. Id. art. 7.
458 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:457
the definitions of such acts,4 a discussion of these issues is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
In Part I, this Article surveys the evolution of crimes against
humanity. This part reviews interpretations of crimes against
humanity by post-World War II tribunals, national courts, and
the International Law Commission ("ILC"). 5 Part II examines
the formulation of crimes against humanity in the statutes that
established the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia6 ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda ("ICTR") .7 It also looks at how the reports issued in
connection with the ICTY statute and the case law from the ICTY
dealt with crimes against humanity. Part III draws some prelimi-
nary conclusions regarding the status of crimes against humanity
in international law in the period directly preceding the Rome
Conference and analyzes the relative authority of the various
sources of law discussed in Parts I and 11. In Part IV, this Article
surveys the issues raised by government delegates regarding
crimes against humanity during the negotiations on the draft
statute for an ICC from 1994 to 1998. Finally, Part V examines at
the debates on crimes against humanity that took place during
the Rome Conference and analyzes the definition of crimes
against humanity adopted in the Rome Statute.
I. EVOLUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
A. Developments Prior to World War IPs
The concept of crimes against humanity traces its origins to
4. For example, the inclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence in Article
7 (l) (g) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute") con-
stitutes an important improvement on the original Nuremberg definition of crimes
against humanity. Id. art. 7 (l)(g). On the other hand, the requirement in Article
7(1) (h) that acts of persecution be committed in connection with another enumerated
act is unprecedented and deeply regrettable. Id. art. 7(1) (h). Also highly controversial
were the definitions of "deportation or forcible transfer of population" in Article
7(2) (d), "forced pregnancy" in Article 7(2)(f), "enforced disappearance of persons" in
Article 7(2)(i), and "gender" in Article 7(3). Id. art. 7(2)(d), (f), (i), 7(3).
5. G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d mtg. at 105, U.N. Doc A/519
(1947).
6. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute].
7. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
8. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of crimes against humanity, see
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the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, in which the Martens Clause
makes reference to the "laws of humanity."9 This language was
echoed in a 1915 Allied condemnation of the Armenian geno-
cide in Turkey.10 Following World War I, an investigatory com-
mission established by the Paris Peace Conference also invoked
the laws of humanity; however, the Treaty of Versailles11 and the
Treaty of Lausanne 2 declined to prosecute crimes against hu-
manity.' 3
B. The Nuremberg Charter and Its Legacy
On August 8, 1945, the four major Allied powers in World
War II signed the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis ("London
Agreement") .14 The Charter of the International Military Tribu-
nal15 ("Nuremberg Charter"), annexed to the London Agree-
ment, contained the first codification of crimes against human-
ity. 16 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, entitled the 'Jurisdic-
tion and General Principles" of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
defined crimes against humanity in paragraph (c) as follows:
Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANrrv IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(1992); Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 172-
73 (1997).
9. Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
10. Vahkn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The
World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L.
221, 233-40 (1989)
11. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June
28, 1919, 2 BEVANS 43, S. TREATv Doc. No. 66-49, reproduced in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 151
(Supp. 1919)
12. Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne, Aug. 6, 1923,
U.S.-Turk., 49 Stat. 2692, reproduced in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1924) (entered into
force Aug. 18, 1934) [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne].
13. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 174-77.
14. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter London
Agreement].
15. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1945) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter]; Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, annexed to London Agreement, supra note 14.
16. Id.
460 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:457
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts commit-
ted against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in ex-
ecution of or in connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 1
7
Because crimes against humanity were prosecuted along with
other crimes, the Nuremberg Tribunal often failed to clarify the
content or the scope of crimes against humanity, in particular,
the distinction between this crime and war crimes or the mean-
ing of key terms such as "any civilian population."'" The Tokyo
Tribunal, established by the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East19 ("Tokyo Charter"), did not provide
any further guidance on crimes against humanity because it pri-
marily prosecuted crimes against peace.20  The definition on
crimes against humanity in the Tokyo Charter was substantially
similar to the one found in the Nuremberg Charter. 21
Allied Control Council Law No. 10 ("Control Council Law
No. 10") governed the prosecution of war criminals within each
of the Allied occupation zones in Germany. 22 The definition of
crimes against humanity in Article 11(c) of Control Council Law
17. Nurnberg Charter, supra note 15, art. 6, 59 Stat. at 1551, 82 U.N.T.S. at 283.
18. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court
of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 310
(1994). Even in the cases of Julius Streicher and Baldur von Schirach, who were only
convicted of crimes against humanity, "[tihe Tribunal's discussion of the charges ...
are essentially factual and do not in any way explain how exactly [their] acts violated
Article 6(c)." Id. at 308.
19. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Procla-
mation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AM. 27 (1946).
20. Lippman, supra note 8, at 202.
21. Two notable differences in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East ("Tokyo Charter") definition were the deletion of persecution on reli-
gious grounds and the addition of a clause on the bases for responsibility, which stated
that "[1] eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes
are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan." See
BASSIOUNI, supra note 8, at 34 (quoting Tokyo Charter).
22. See Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of
the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin (Jan. 31, 1946), reprinted in BASSIOUNI,
supra note 8, at 590 (defining crimes against humanity as "[a] trocities and offenses,
including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, impris-
onment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
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No. 10 removed the requirement of a connection with either
crimes against peace or war crimes.2 3 This modification enabled
U.S. tribunals to de-link crimes against humanity from armed
conflict in United States v. Josef Altstoetter24 (the 'Justice Case")
and United States v. Otto Ohlendorf (the "Einsatzgrupen Case") .25
Another significant development that emerged from these tribu-
nals was the restriction of the definition of crimes against hu-
manity to the "systematic commission of severe, State-sponsored
delicts. 2
6
Following the judgments issued by the Nuremberg, Tokyo,
and Control Council Law No. 10 tribunals, subsequent interna-
tional instruments affirmed and expanded upon the definition
of crimes against humanity. 27 The Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 28 ("Genocide
Convention") and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Human-
ity29 ("Convention on Statutory Limitations") explicitly stated
the principle that crimes against humanity do not require a
tion, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation
of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.").
23. Id. art. 111(c)
24. United States v. Josef Altstoetter, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL CONCIL LAw No. 10, at
954 (1951)
25. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, reprinted in IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL CONCIL LAW No. 10, at
411 (1950)
26. Lippman, supra note 8, at 212.
27. Such instruments included the Affirmation of the Principles of International
Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal: the Report of the Sixth
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, 55th plen. mtg. at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236
(1946) (also appears as G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946)); the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; the Convention on the Non-Applica-
bility of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26,
1968, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968) [hereinafter Convention on Statutory Limitations]; the International Conven-
tion on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973,
G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1973) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention]; and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess. Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984).
28. Genocide Convention, supra note 27.
29. Convention on Statutory Limitations, supra note 27.
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nexus with armed conflict.
30
C. Codification of Crimes Against Humanity by the International
Law Commission
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly created the
ILC to codify international law. 1 One of the ILC's first tasks was
to formulate the "principles of international law recognized in
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of
the Tribunal." 2 In its report on the "Formulation of the Nurem-
berg Principles,""3 ("1950 Formation of the Nuremberg Princi-
ples") the ILC based its comments on the following definition of
crimes against humanity: "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are car-
ried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against
peace or any war crime. '13 4 The omission of the phrase "before
or during war," used in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter,35
was due to the ILC's view that it only referred to a "particular
war, the war of 1939."36 The ILC, however, warned that the dele-
tion did not signify that "crimes against humanity can be com-
mitted only during a war, since such crimes may take place also
before a war in connection with crimes against peace.
3 v
The ILC also observed that Article 6(c) had contained two
types of crimes against humanity, "murder ... and other inhu-
man acts" and "persecution on political, racial, or religious
30. See Genocide Convention, supra note 27, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280 (declaring
that "[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish."); Convention on Statutory Limitations, supra note 27, art. I
(stating that "[n]o statutory limitation shall apply to war crimes ... [and] [c]rimes
against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace.").
31. G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d mtg. at 105, U.N. Doc A/519
(1947).
32. G.A. Res. 177(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d mtg. at 111, U.N. Doc. A/519
(1947).
33. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12,
U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 11 (1950) [hereinafter 1950 ILC Report].
34. Id.
35. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 15, art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288, 59 Stat. at
1557.
36. 1950 ILC Report, supra note 33, 124.
37. Id.
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grounds.""8 This categorization makes it clear that the ILC
viewed the phrase "on political, racial or religious grounds" as
clarifying the bases of persecution, rather than imposing a re-
quirement of a discriminatory motive for inhuman acts. This in-
terpretation is also supported by the 1949 Memorandum of the
Secretary-General on the Charter and Judgment of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, which stated:
It might perhaps be argued that the phrase "on political, ra-
cial or religious grounds" refers not only to persecutions but
also to the first type of crimes against humanity. The British
Chief Prosecutor possibly held that opinion as he spoke of
"murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on polit-
ical racial or religious grounds." This interpretation, how-
ever, seems hardly to be warranted by, the English wording
and still less by the French text.39
Finally, in interpreting the term "any civilian population," the
ILC focused on the word "any" to conclude that the term would
extend the application of the definition to acts committed by the
perpetrator against his own population.
In 1951, the ILC adopted the first Draft Code of Offenses
against the Peace and Security of Mankind4" ("1951 Draft
Code") after consideration of government submissions and re-
ports by Special Rapporteur Mr. Jean Spiropoulos. Crimes
against humanity were defined in Article 2(10) of the 1951 Draft
Code as:
"Inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by private individ-
uals against any civilian population, such as mass murder, or ex-
termination or enslavement, or deportation, or persecutions on
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, when such acts are
committed in execution of or in connection with the offenses
defined in this article. 41
Instead of requiring a nexus with either war crimes or crimes
against peace, this formulation required crimes against human-
38. Id.
39. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997), Opinion and
Judgment, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber,
652 [hereinafter TadicJudgment] (citing SECRETARY-GENERAL, MEMORANDUM ON THE
CHARTER AND JUDGEMENT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL: HISTORY AND ANALYsIs at 67,
U.N. Sales No. E.49.II. (1949)).
40. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 6th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951) [hereinafter 1951 ILC Draft Code].
41. Id. art. 2(10).
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ity to be connected with "the offenses defined in this article."4 2
Among the crimes enumerated in Article 2 of the 1951 Draft
Code was genocide, and the Genocide Convention of 1948 had
already recognized that genocide could be committed in time of
peace.4 ' Thus, the 1951 Draft Code definition of crimes against
humanity continued to move away from the requirement of a
nexus with armed conflict. 44 Another development in this defi-
nition was its explicit recognition that both State authorities and
private individuals may commit crimes against humanity.4 5
In 1954, the ILC amended the definition of crimes against
humanity to read: "Inhuman acts such as murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation or persecution, committed
against any civilian population on social, political, racial, reli-
gious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by pri-
vate individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of
such authorities. '46 The revision eliminates altogether the re-
quirement that crimes against humanity be committed in con-
nection with another crime. As explained by the ILC, this revi-
sion was done with the intention to "enlarge the scope of the
paragraph."47 On the other hand, the application of the defini-
tion was narrowed, at least with respect to private actors, by the
new requirement that private individuals act "at the instigation
or toleration" of State authorities.
Rather than maintaining the two categories of crimes
against humanity, as set forth in the ILC's 1950 Formulation of
Nuremberg Principles, the 1954 formulation collapses both per-
secution and other crimes-murder, extermination, enslavement,
and deportation-under the single category of "inhuman acts. 48
Furthermore, the discriminatory grounds that had immediately
42. Id.
43. Genocide Convention, supra note 27, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
44. ILC 1951 Draft Code, supra note 40. Other crimes defined in Article 2 of the
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("1951 Draft Code")
included aggression, terrorism, genocide, and war crimes. Id.
45. Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter did not bar the prosecution of private
individuals. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 15, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1557, 82
U.N.T.S. at 288. Indeed, three private indviduals who were industrialists, rather than
government officials, were prosecuted under Allied Control Council Law No. 10. See
Lippman, supra note 8, at 205.
46. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 9th
Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 ILC Draft Code].
47. Id. cmt. to art. 2(11).
48. Id. at 11.
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followed the word "persecution" in earlier versions were moved
to the latter part of the definition.49 Their new placement sug-
gests that it may be necessary to establish that the other inhuman
acts, and notjust persecution, were committed on discriminatory
grounds. The ILC, however, did not indicate its intent to im-
pose this additional requirement nor did it offer any explanation
for these changes.
Following the submission of the '1954 Draft Code of Of-
fenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("1954 Draft
Code"), further discussion on this work was suspended for sev-
eral decades because the "Cold War had made the entire exer-
cise highly controversial. 5 ° In 1981, the Allied General Assem-
bly requested the ILC to return to its work on the Draft Code of
Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind5' ("Draft
Code of Offences"), which in 1987 was renamed the Draft Code
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("1991
Draft Code").52 The Draft Code that was finally adopted by the
ILC in 1991 defined twelve crimes, but did not contain a specific
article on crimes against humanity." Article 21, defining "sys-
tematic or mass violations of human rights," bore the closest re-
semblance to this crime.5 4 The definition of "systematic or mass
violations of human rights," however, differs from the 1954 Draft
Code definition of crimes against humanity in a number of sig-
nificant ways.55 Because the ILC did not indicate that this crime
was intended as a substitute for crimes against humanity, its sig-
49. Id.
50. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
at 238, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 ILC Report].
51. G.A. Res. 106, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess. (1981).
52. 1991 ILC Report, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Id. Article 21 of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind ("1991 Draft Code") on "systematic or mass violations of human rights" states
that "[a]n individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following
violations of human rights... in a systematic manner or on a mass scale;... shall, on
conviction thereof, be sentenced .... Id. art. 21.
55. The "systematic and mass scale" criteria are new, reflecting interpretations of
crimes against humanity by national courts in the intervening years. There is no exami-
nation of whether the individual is acting in an official or private capacity, and thus,
even in the case of the latter, there is no requirement that such actions were taken at
the instigation of or with the tolerance of State authorities. Finally, the definition does
not address whether this crime may be committed in time of peace, nor is there any
reference to the relevant group of protected persons, the civilian population.
19981
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nificance in reflecting the development of crimes against hu-
manity in international law is limited.
After receiving government observations on the 1991 Draft
Code and examining further reports by the Special Rapporteur
Mr. Doudou Thiam, the ILC adopted another Draft Code of
Crimes in 1996 ("1996 Draft Code"). 56 The 1996 Draft Code
contained a shorter list of enumerated crimes, but included
crimes against humanity this time. The chapeau to Article 18
provided that "[a] crime against humanity means any of the fol-
lowing acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a
large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any
organization or group."57
The ILC affirmed that crimes against humanity do not re-
quire a nexus with armed conflict. The ILC cited Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10, the Genocide Convention, the Statute for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia58
("ICTY Statute"), the Statute for the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda59 ("ICTR Statute"), and the ICTY's case law as
standing for the proposition that crimes against humanity may
be committed in peace time.6 °
The 1996 Draft Codes's definition also imposed the two
"general conditions" for an act to reach the level of a crime
against humanity.6' First, the act must be committed in a "sys-
tematic manner or on a large scale. ' 62 While conceding that
these conditions were not found in the Nuremberg Charter, the
ILC observed that the Nuremberg Tribunal took note of these
elements when determining whether certain inhumane acts rose
to the level of crimes against humanity definition and that the
1996 Draft Code's definition is intended to reflect "subsequent
developments in international law since Nuremberg. '' 6' The ILC
also clarified that these conditions existed in the alternative.
"Consequently, an act could constitute a crime against humanity
56. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
45, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 ILC Report].
57. Id. art. 18.
58. ICTY Statute, supra note 6.
59. ICTR Statute, supra note 7.
60. 1996 ILC Report, supra note 56, cmt. to art. 18, 6.
61. Id. 3.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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if either of these conditions is met. "64
For an act to be systematic, it must be committed "pursuant
to a preconceived plan or policy. The implementation of this
plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous com-
mission of inhumane acts."65 This requirement was imposed to
avoid the prosecution of a "random act" as a crime against hu-
manity." On the other hand, the term "large scale" referred to
situations "involving a multiplicity of victims, for example, as a
result of the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the
singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magni-
tude."6 7 Here, this requirement aimed to exclude an "isolated
inhumane act committed by a perpetrator acting on his own ini-
tiative and directed against a single victim."6 8
The ILC also required a second condition, that crimes
against humanity be "instigated or directed by a Government or
by any organization or group."69 While the ILC discussed the
need to exclude isolated acts by an individual, it was also con-
cerned with distinguishing ordinary criminal conduct from a
crime against humanity, which is a crime of an international na-
ture. Thus, the ILC explained that it is this second element that
"gives the act its great dimension. "70
The 1996 Draft Code required more active involvement on
the part of the relevant authorities than the 1954 Draft Code,
which only required State instigation or tolerance of the act.
The 1996 Draft Code's definition, however, encompassed acts in-
stigated or directed not only by State authorities, but also by "any
organization or group. "71 This definition would enable groups
that exercise defacto control over a territory, without official rec-
ognition as the legitimate state authority, to be held responsible
for crimes against humanity. Indeed, the ILC's failure to give
any guidelines on what constitutes an "organization" or a
"group," except to say that they "may or may not be affiliated
with a Government, "72 suggests that the definition may even ap-
64. Id. 4.
65. Id. 3.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. 4.
69. Id. 5.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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ply to criminal organizations or corporations.
Finally, the 1996 Draft Code's definition made no reference
to "any civilian population" or to a general requirement of the
discriminatory motive. Following the 1954 Draft Code's formu-
lation, it listed persecution as among the inhumane acts. The
grounds for discrimination, however, clearly apply to acts of per-
secution only.
In sum, after the Nuremberg Judgment, the ILC quickly
moved to reject the need for a nexus between crimes against
humanity and armed conflict and in 1954, eliminated altogether
the need for crimes against humanity to be committed with any
other crime. With regard to the requirement of a discriminatory
motive, the ILC's early interpretation of the Nuremberg Charter
strongly suggested that the grounds for discrimination apply
only to acts of persecution. The ILC's 1954 formulation of
crimes against humanity in the 1954 Draft Code may suggest that
other inhumane acts must also be committed on discriminatory
grounds, but neither the ILC's comments nor the subsequent
definition in 1996 lend support to this argument.
All ILC drafts of crimes against humanity, save the 1996 Yer-
sion, identified "any civilian population" as the relevant group of
protected persons.7" The only time that the ILC interpreted this
term, however, was in 1951, to explain that crimes against hu-
manity could encompass acts committed by the perpetrator
against his own population."4
The requirement of State participation in crimes against hu-
manity, at first explicitly rejected in the 1951 Draft Code's defini-
tion,75 was incorporated in the 1954 Draft Code's revision.76
The 1996 Draft Code's definition required crimes against hu-
manity to be instigated or directed by authorities, rather than
instigated or merely tolerated, as provided in the 1954 Draft
Code. The 1996 Draft Code, however, broadened the term "au-
thorities" to include organizations and groups in addition to gov-
ernments.
Finally, the 1996 Draft Code required crimes against hu-
73. See 1951 ILC Draft Code, supra note 40; 1954 ILC Draft Code, supra note 46. But
see 1991 ILC Report, supra note 50.
74. See 1951 ILC Draft Code, supra note 40.
75. Id.
76. 1954 ILC Draft Code, supra note 46.
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manity to be committed in a systematic manner or on a large
scale.77 Inquiry into systemacity involves an examination of
whether there is a "preconceived plan or policy," while a "multi-
plicity of victims" is required to establish a large scale violation.78
D. Domestic Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity
According to the principle of universal jurisdiction, certain
crimes are so offensive to the universal community as a whole
that any national court may assert jurisdiction over their perpe-
trators without relying on the usual bases of jurisdic-
tion-territoriality,79  nationality, 0  or passive personality.8 '
Crimes against humanity are recognized as being among the
crimes over which universal jurisdiction exists.8 2 Since the Nu-
remberg Tribunal, several domestic courts have undertaken
prosecutions of crimes against humanity, invoking either the
traditional bases for jurisdiction or the principle of universal ju-
risdiction. 3 This section focuses on interpretations of crimes
against humanity by domestic courts in the past decade, as these
interpretations will have particular relevance for understanding
the state of international law prior to the Rome Conference.
1. France: Prosecution of Klaus Barbie
In February 1982, the public prosecutor of Lyon charged
Klaus Barbie, a former head of the Gestapo based in Lyon, with
crimes against humanity.84 Barbie had previously been con-
victed, in absentia, for war crimes, but this time he was expelled
from his refuge in Bolivia and forced to stand trial in France.85
Applying the Nuremberg Charter definition of crimes
77. 1996 ILC Report, supra note 56.
78. Id.
79. Territorial jurisdiction exists when the offense is committed on the state's terri-
tory.
80. Nationality jurisdiction exists when the accused is a national of the state.
81. Passive personality jurisdiction exists when the victim is a national of the state.
82. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L.
REv. 785, 800 (1988).
83. Lippman, supra note 8, at 24043, 253-55.
84. Prosecutor v. Barbie, Judgment of Oct. 6, 1983, Cass. crim., 1984 D.S. Jur. 113,
J.C.P. 1983, II, G, No. 20, 107 (1983).
85. Wexler, supra note 18, at 331-33.
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against humanity, 6 the Indicting Chamber of the Court of Ap-
peals of Lyon on October 4, 1985, declined to charge Barbie for
arresting and torturing to death a Jewish member of the Resist-
ance because it was unclear whether his victim had been selected
for being Jewish or for participating in the resistance. 7 Under
the appellate court's strict interpretation of the term "any civil-
ian population," members of the Resistance could not be consid-
ered civilians."8 While rejecting the lower court's ruling, the
Court of Cassation's interpretation, in turn, introduced new ob-
stacles to the prosecution of crimes against humanity. In its
opinion of December 20, 1985, the Court of Cassation defined
crimes against humanity as:
the inhumane acts and the persecutions which, in the name
of a State practicing a hegemonic political ideology, have
been committed in a systematic fashion, not only against per-
sons because they belong to a racial or religious group, but
also against the adversaries of this [State] policy, whatever the
form of their opposition.89
This interpretation emphasizes three elements of crimes
against humanity. The first element is that the crimes must be
committed in a systematic manner.9 ° The second element re-
quires that the perpetrator must act with a discriminatory mo-
tive, based on the race, religion, or ideology of the victim.91 The
Court of Cassation's final element requires that crimes against
humanity be committed in accordance with a State's "hege-
monic political ideology."92
In affirming Barbie's conviction on June 3, 1988, the Court
of Cassation further held that:
[t]he fact that the accused.., took part, in perpetrating that
crime, in the execution of a common plan to bring about the
deportation or extermination of the civilian population dur-
ing the war or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, constitutes not a separate offense or an aggravating
86. The Court of Cassation ruled in its October 1983 and January 1984 opinions
that the Nuremberg Charter had been incorporated into French law. Id. at 337.
87. Barbie,J.C.P. 1983, II, G, No. 20.
88. Wexler, supra note 18, at 339.
89. Id. at 342.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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circumstance but . . . an essential element of the crime
against humanity consisting in the fact that the acts ... were
performed in a systematic manner in the name of a State
practicing ... a policy of ideological supremacy.9 3
The additional requirement of a "common plan" has been criti-
cized as a misinterpretation of Article 6 of the Nuremberg Char-
ter, which included this language to provide for the criminal lia-
bility of conspirators, but did not intend to add this as a substan-
tive element of the definition of crimes against humanity.9 4
2. France: Prosecution of Paul Touvier
Paul Touvier was a French officer in the Milice (Militia) of
the Vichy regime. Tried in absentia for treason, Touvier re-
ceived two death sentences in 1946 and 1947 and a presidential
pardon in 1971." Shortly thereafter, several individuals filed
charges of crimes against humanity against Touvier.96 Investiga-
tion into the Touvier case, however, was postponed until 1979,
when the Minister of Foreign Affairs affirmed the im-
prescriptability of crimes against hurnanity.9 7 The Indicting
Chamber of the Court of Appeals in Paris dismissed all eleven
charges against Touvier, citing lack of evidence.9 8 With regard
to Touvier's involvement in the killing of seven Jews in Rillieux,
the appellate court held that Touvier lacked the requisite in-
tent.9 9 It ruled that an individual:
cannot be held to have committed a crime against humanity
unless it is also established that he had a specific motivation
to take part in the execution of a common plan by commit-
ting in a systematic manner inhuman acts or persecutions in
the name of a State practicing a policy of ideological
supremacy. 10
0
Relying on the Barbiejudgments of 1985 and 1988, the Court of
93. Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes and
Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 124, 137 (1988) (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber
1983-85); see Lippman, supra note 8, at 258 (citing Barbie).
94. Wexler, supra note 18, at 361.
95. Id. at 322.
96. Id. at 322-25.
97. Id.
98. Prosecutor v. Touvier, 100 I.L.R. 341, 350 (1992) (Court of Cassation, Criminal
Chamber 1992).
99. Id. at 349-50.
100. Id. at 358.
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Appeals applied three elements of crimes against humanity iden-
tified therein: 1) the systematic nature of the crimes; 2) the per-
petrator's participation in a common plan; and 3) the perpetra-
tor's intent to carry out a State policy of political hegemony.
10 1
With regard to the last element, the Court of Appeals, however,
refused to rule that the Vichy regime practiced a hegemonic
political ideology.10 2 In reversing the lower court's decision re-
garding the Rillieux massacre, 10 3 the Court of Cassation held
that because Touvier proceeded on the basis of orders from the
Gestapo, which did practice a hegemonic ideology, his acts fell
within the definition of crimes against humanity. 10 4
3. Canada: Prosecution of Imre Finta
Imre Finta served in the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie in
1944 and headed the investigative unit at Szeged, Hungary,
where approximately 9,000 Jews were confined, robbed, and de-
ported to concentration camps in Auschwitz and Strasshof.'0 5 In
1988, Finta was charged with war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity.10 6 Ajury acquitted Finta of all charges, and this acquittal
was upheld by both the Ontario Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Canada. 10 7 Among the issues examined by
the Supreme Court was whether the trial judge had properly in-
structed the jury on the requisite mens rea for crimes against hu-
manity.'0 8
101. Lippman, supra note 8, at 258.
102. Id.
103. As for the other 10 dismissed charges, six charges were not appealed, and the
Court of Cassation affirmed the finding of insufficient evidence for the remaining four
charges. Wexler, supra note 18, at 351-52.
104. Id. at 352.
105. Regina v. Finta, [1994] S.C.R. 701, 812 (Can.).
106. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. at 812. The Canadian Criminal Code defines crimes
against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution or any other
inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population or
any identifiable group of persons, whether or not it constitutes a contraven-
tion of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission, and
that, at that time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of customary
international law or conventional international law or is criminal according to
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
CPMINAL CODE § 7(3.76) (Can.).
107. Judith H. Bellow & Irwin Coder, Regina v. Finta, 90 Am.J. INT'L L. 460, 461-62
(1996).
108. Id. at 461-62.
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In distinguishing international crimes from domestic
crimes, the Supreme Court stated that "with respect to crimes
against humanity, the additional element is that the inhumane
acts were based on discrimination against or the persecution of
an identifiable group of people."10 9 The Supreme Court further
ruled that:
[t]he mental element required to be proven to constitute a
crime against humanity is that the accused was aware of or
willfully blind to the facts or circumstances which would bring
his or her acts within the definition of a crime against human-
ity. However, it would not be necessary to establish that the
accused knew that his or her actions were inhumane. For ex-
ample, if the jury was satisfied that Finta was aware of the con-
ditions within the boxcars [in which the Jews were deported],
that would be sufficient to convict him of crimes against hu-
manity even though he did not know that his actions in load-
ing the people into those boxcars were inhumane. 110
Finally, the Supreme Court also held that the trial judge
properly instructed to jury to examine whether Finta "knew or
was aware that he was assisting in a policy of persecution."111
While noting that the element of State policy of persecution or
discrimination was not found in the Canadian Criminal Code,
the Supreme Court held that this was a "pre-requisite legal ele-
ment of crimes against humanity."' 1 2
4. Cases Viewed Together
In sum, the decision by the French Court of Cassation in
Barbie added a number of new elements to the definition of
crimes against humanity. Contrary to the ILC's 1950 Formula-
tion of Nuremberg Principles," 3 the French Court of Cassation
ruled that the perpetrator of a crimes against humanity must be
motivated by discriminatory intent based on political, racial, or
religious grounds. 4 Even if such an interpretation were based
on the language and structure of the ILC's 1954 Draft Code, it
109. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. at 813.
110. Id. at 820; see Bellow & Cofder, supra note 107, at 472 (arguing that trial judge
erred in instructing jury to ask: "Does he know it is an inhumane act?").
11. Regina v. Finta, [1994] S.C.R. 701, 822-23 (Can.).
112. Id.
113. 1950 ILC Report, supra note 33.
114. Barbie, J.C.P. 1983, II, G, No. 20.
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still deviates from the ILC definition by omitting social and cul-
tural grounds as possible bases for discrimination. The Supreme
Court of Canada also required a discriminatory motive, even
though it is not explicitly included in Section 7(3.76) of the Ca-
nadian Criminal Code. 115
The requirement that crimes against humanity be commit-
ted in a systematic manner is not entirely new because this had
been raised in the Justice Case decided under Control Council
Law No. 10. The ILC, however, had never recognized this ele-
ment in its reports or Draft Codes. Nevertheless, the French
courts in the Barbie and Touvier judgments fully accepted sys-
temacity as an integral element of crimes against humanity.
The requirement articulated in both the Barbie and Touvier
decisions that crimes against humanity must be committed as
part of a common plan in furtherance of a State policy of polit-
ical hegemony is completely novel and raises complex problems
of interpretation.1 1 6 There are two elements of this require-
ment. First, there must be a "common plan" to commit the pro-
hibited acts, and second, the commission of such acts must be in
furtherance of a State policy.
With regard to the first element, it is unclear who the archi-
tect of the common plan must be. If it is the State's common
plan, then this requirement goes beyond the condition in the
1954 Draft Code, which only called for State participation in
crimes against humanity in the form of either instigation or tol-
erance.
As for the second element, the definition does not call for a
State policy to commit crimes against humanity, but for a very
specific kind of policy. The French Court of Cassation required
a State policy of political hegemony, while the Canadian
Supreme Court wanted a State policy of discrimination. The fo-
cus on the State is problematic in situations where crimes may be
committed to further the objectives of a non-state actor. Fur-
thermore, aside from the difficulties of interpreting a term as
115. The requirement that inhumane acts be committed against "any civilian pop-
ulation or any identifiable group of person" suggests an implicit requirement of dis-
criminatory intent because the perpetrator must have a basis on which to identify such
groups.
116. See Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 653 (holding that "[t]raditionally
this requirement [that the acts target a civilian population] was understood to mean
that there must be some form of policy to commit these acts.").
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vague as "political hegemony," it is undesirable to define the req-
uisite State policy narrowly because it would exclude inhumane
acts that have been systematically committed to advance other
policy objectives of a State. To construe the definition in such a
rigid manner would lead to the absurd result reached by Profes-
sor Bassiouni, who has argued that the practice by the United
States and Canada of placing citizens of Japanese ethnicity in
concentration camps during World War II did not constitute
crimes against humanity."' His reasoning was this practice was
"not motivated by, nor seeking to result- in, 'persecution' of that
group of persons even though it discriminated against an identi-
fiable group. ' 18
The decisions in the Barbie, Touvier, and Finta cases were
delivered in a vacuum of guidance from the ILC about the
proper scope and content of crimes against humanity. During
the ILC's suspension of consideration of the Draft Code, there
were also no international tribunals adjudicating cases of crimes
against humanity.119 Critics of the French interpretation of
crimes against humanity have characterized the new elements in
the definition-the requirements of a "common plan" and a
"State policy of political hegemony"-as "blatant attempts to ex-
onerate, in advance, the Vichy government from wrong"' 20 or to
shield the French government from responsibility for acts in the
Algerian War.12 ' Whether or not the interpretations by domestic
courts were the result of impure motives or an erroneous read-
ing of international law, they nevertheless directed the develop-
ment of crimes against humanity, as is evident from the ICTY
117. BAsSIOUNI, supra note 8, at 252. Bassiouni has also stated that "[t]hroughout
history... the terms 'persecute' and 'persecution' have come to be understood to refer
to discriminatory practice resulting in physical or mental harm, economic harm, or all
of the above." Id. at 317. Thus, the internment of Japanese-Americans and Japanese-
Canadians, which constituted forcible transfer of population and persecution (both
listed within the list of enumerated acts under the 1996 International Law Commission
("ILC") definition of crimes against humanity) of a population according to State pol-
icy, do qualify as crimes against humanity, regardless of the primary objective of that
State policy.
118. Id.
119. Although the Finta decision was issued in 1994, the Canadian Supreme Court
in Regina v. Finta made no reference to the Statute of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY Statute") or the Secretary-General's Report on
the ICTY Statute, discussed in Part II.
120. See Wexler, supra note 18, at 355.
121. Id. (citing and translating Pierre Poncela, L'humanite, une victime peu presenta-
ble, 34 D.S. JuR. CHRONIQUE 229-30 (1991)).
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Statute, the ICTR statute, the reports issued in connection with
those tribunals, and the 1996 ILC Draft Code.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
AND RWANDA
A. The Statutes for the Tribunals and the Reports of the Secretary-
General and Commission of Experts
Responding to the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the U.N. Security Council acted under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter to establish ad hoc tribunals to prose-
cute the perpetrators of serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law. 1 2 2 The ICTY Statute was adopted unanimously
by the Security Council on May 25, 1993.123 The following year,
the ICTR Statute was also adopted. 124 The two tribunals had ju-
risdiction over war crimes-the grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and/or violations of the laws or customs of
war-genocide, and crimes against humanity. 125
The chapeau to the definition of crimes against humanity in
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute reads: "The International Tribunal
shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether in-
ternational or internal in character, and directed against any ci-
vilian population."126 In the U.N. Secretary-General's report on
the ICTY Statute, he noted, in an opinion contrary to the lan-
guage of the Article 5, that crimes against humanity are "prohib-
ited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed con-
flict, international or internal in character. 1 27 The report also
observes that inhumane acts have to be "committed as part of a
122. U.N. Charter, art. 1, ch IV.
123. ICTY Statute, supra note 6.
124. ICTR Statute, supra note 7.
125. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, arts. 2-5; ICTR Statute, supra note 7, arts. 2-4.
Because the situation in Rwanda involved an internal armed conflict, the ICTR only
looked at violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
126. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5. The crimes enumerated were murder, ex-
termination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on
political, racial, and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts. Id.
127. Report of the Secretaiy-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704, 47 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-Gen-
eral's Report].
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widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
1 28
In 1992, the Secretary-General, at the request of the Secur-
ity Council, appointed a Commission of Experts ("Commission")
to assess the violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in the former Yugoslavia. 121 In its final report issued in
May 1994, the Commission presented factual findings and pro-
vided legal commentary on the ICTY Statute ("Commission's Re-
port"). 3 ° The Commission stated that "crimes against humanity
apply to all contexts," and to both international and internal
armed conflict.13 1
Focusing on the word "civilian," the Commission noted that
while the term "any civilian population" principally applies to
noncombatants, it does not necessarily exclude those "who at
one particular point in time did bear arms.' 3 2 For example,
crimes committed against those who use arms to defend
themselves or their community, such as the "sole policeman or
local defense guard," may still come within the definition of
crimes against humanity.' 33  The Commission urged that
"[i]nformation of the overall circumstances is relevant for the
interpretation of the provision in a spirit consistent with its pur-
pose. ' 134
The Commission also noted other conditions for crimes
against humanity. The acts must be carried out pursuant to a
"policy of persecution or discrimination.""'3 The acts also must
be committed in a systematic manner or on a mass scale.' 36
Although the Commission presented systemacity and mass scale
as alternative conditions, using the word "or," in its subsequent
discussion, it seems to treat the two as related elements in a sin-
128. Id. 48.
129. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780
(1992).
130. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter
Commission of Experts' Report]; Annexes to the Final Report, U.N. Doc S/1994/674/
Add.2, 1 75 (1994) [hereinafter Annexes to Commission of Experts' Report].
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. 78.
135. Id. 84.
136. Id.
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gle requirement. 13
7
Closely following the Secretary-General's observations of the
ICTY Statute, the definition of crimes against humanity in the
ICTR Statute deleted any reference to armed conflict but incor-
porated a requirement of a discriminatory motive. The ICTR
Statute was adopted after the Commission issued its report on
the ICTY Statute. The chapeau of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute,
defining crimes against humanity, reads: "The International Tri-
bunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons re-
sponsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."138
In sum, it is important to note that the articles on crimes
against humanity in the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute open
with the phrase, "The International Tribunal ... shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for the following
crimes." ' 9 As such, these articles are not intended to define
crimes against humanity, but, rather, to define the scope of the
Tribunals' jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Therefore,
the nexus with armed conflict in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute
was interpreted in the U.N. Secretary-General's report as not re-
flecting the state of international law, which prohibits crimes
against humanity even in peacetime, but merely imposing a re-
striction on the ICTY's jurisdiction. The Secretary-General's ob-
servation was affirmed by the Commission and the ICTR Statute,
which deleted the reference to armed conflict altogether.
The Secretary-General's report stated that crimes against
humanity must be committed as part of a "widespread or system-
atic attack" and on discriminatory grounds.14 ° The Commission
took the latter element a step further by requiring a "policy of
persecution or discrimination," echoing the language of the
Finta decision. 4' Neither the Secretary-General nor the Com-
mission explain the basis for the requirement of discriminatory
137. For example, the Commission states that "[i]t is the overall context of large-
scale victimization carried out as part of a common plan or design which goes to the
element of systemacity." Id. Also, the heading of this section is "Widespread and Sys-
tematic Nature of Acts." Id.
138. ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3.
139. Id.; ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art 5.
140. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 127.
141. Commission of Experts' Report, supra note 130.
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intent. Indeed, such a requirement would appear to be at odds
with the recognition that crimes against humanity may be di-
rected against "any civilian population" because only national,
political, ethnic, racial, or religious groups can claim to have suf-
fered crimes against humanity. The Commission's interpreta-
tion of "any civilian population" did not address this point,
merely noting that the term applies foremost to noncombatants,
but may in certain situations be extended to others.142
B. Decisions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
In February 1995, the Prosecutor of the ICTY indicted
Dusko Tadic for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Tadic,
a Bosnian Serb, was alleged to have participated with Serb forces
in the "killings, torture, sexual assaults and other physical and
psychological abuse" of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the
Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje camps and in neighboring
villages.143 Tadic challenged the ICTY's jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity, contending that Article 5 of the ICTY Stat-
ute' constituted an ex post facto law. Tadic argued that the defi-
nition of crimes against humanity did not conform to contempo-
rary international law, which required such crimes to be commit-
ted in an international armed conflict. 45 In its decision on the
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction146
("Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction"), the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY rejected this argument by affirming that crimes against hu-
manity can even be committed in peacetime:1 47
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to inter-
national armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points
out, customary international law may not require a connec-
tion between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.
Thus, by requiring that crimes against humanity be commit-
142. Id.
143. Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 38.
144. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5.
145. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, 139 (1995), Decision of
the Appeals Chamber on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber [herein-
after Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction].
146. Id.
147. Id. 141.
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ted in either internal or international armed conflict, the Se-
curity Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 more
narrowly than necessary.1
48
In its Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the
Rule of Procedure and Evidence of Dragan Nikolic 149 ("Nikolic
Rule 61 Decision"), the Trial Chamber of the ICTY ("ICTY Trial
Chamber") reaffirmed that although Article 5 of the ICTY Stat-
ute required a nexus with armed conflict, such a requirement is
unnecessary under international law. The ICTY Trial Chamber
also noted that Article 5 required crimes against humanity to be
committed under a second set of circumstances, that is, the acts
must be "directed against any civilian population." The ICTY
Trial Chamber interpreted this term as having three elements.
First, the civilian population must be "specifically identified as a
group by the perpetrators of these acts. 1 50 Although the ICTY
Trial Chamber does not articulate the bases for such an identifi-
cation, this interpretation suggests the ICTY Trial Chamber's ac-
ceptance of the need for a discriminatory motive. The other two
components raised by the ICTY Trial Chamber are that the
crimes must be "organized and systematic" and "of a certain
scale and gravity. 15 1 The ICTY Trial Chamber's approach in
reading these elements into the meaning of "any civilian popula-
tion" is a novel one. The ICTY Trial Chamber also appeared to
require both elements to be present, rather than accepting them
as alternative conditions.152
In another decision pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence 153 ("Rule 61"), regarding Mile Msksic,
Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin5 4 ("Vukovar Hospital
148. Id.
149. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61 (1995), Review of Indict-
ment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber. According to Rule 61 of the
Rules of Procedure for the ICTY, a second confirmation of the indictment would en-
able the ICTY to issue an international arrest warrant for the accused. See International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 61, U.N. Doc. IT/32, reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
484 (1994) [hereinafter Rule 61].
150. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61.
151. Id.
152. Id. 26.
153. Rule 61, supra note 149, 33 I.L.M. 484 (1994).
154. Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, Case No.
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Rule 61 Decision"), the ICTY Trial Chamber revisited the inter-
pretation of "any civilian population." Focusing on the term "ci-
vilian," the ICTY Trial Chamber relied on the Barbie decision
and the Commission report to interpret this term as extending
beyond noncombatants, under certain circumstances.155 Next,
the ICTY Trial Chamber noted that a crime against humanity
must:
be widespread or demonstrate a systematic character. How-
ever, as long as there is a link with the widespread or system-
atic attack against a civilian population, a single act could
qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an individual
committing a crime against a single victim or a limited
number of victims might be recognized as guilty of a crime
against humanity if his acts were part of the specified context
identified above.' 56
The judgment against Dusko Tadic was delivered on May 7,
1997. In the 300 page Tadic Opinion and Judgment 5 7 ("Tadic
Judgment"), Tadic was convicted of eleven out of thirty-one
counts. The opinion contained a comprehensive discussion of
the elements of crimes against humanity and the requisite
mental element.
The ICTY Trial Chamber did not spend much time on the
first element, the requirement that crimes against humanity
must be committed in armed conflict.15 8 Affirming that interna-
tional law now de-links crimes against humanity from armed
conflict, the ICTY Trial Chamber recognized that this nexus had
nevertheless been imposed as a restriction on the ICTY Trial
Chamber's jurisdiction."5 9 It further held that the crimes against
humanity occurred in a context that conformed to the definition
of armed conflict as articulated by the Appeals Chamber. 6 °
IT-95-13-R61 (Apr. 3, 1996), Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Trial Chamber. This case involved killings and beatings by the Yugoslav People's Army,
directed against patients, civilians, and former resistance fighters who had sought shel-
ter at the Vukovar Hospital.
155. Id.
156. Id. 30.
157. Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Oct. 2, 1995).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. 628 (holding that "[a]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.").
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The ICTY Trial Chamber then turned to the interpretation
of "any civilian population," examining each word in turn, in a
complex, multi-level analysis. With regard to the word "any," the
ICTY Trial Chamber followed the approach of the ILC in its
1950 Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, noting that the
nationality of the targeted population was irrelevant. Crimes
against humanity could be committed against individuals who
shared the same nationality as the perpetrator or even against
civilians who were stateless. 161
In determining whether an individual qualifies as a "civil-
ian," the ICTY Trial Chamber cited with approval the Commis-
sion's observation that while the term applies primarily to non-
combatants, it may also cover those who were once non-civilians
but had since laid down their arms or those who use force in self-
defense. 162 Furthermore, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that if a
population was "predominantly" civilian, then the presence of a
few non-civilians would not defeat this characterization. 163
Finally, the word "population" was treated as the rug under
which all the remaining elements of crimes against humanity
were swept. As explained by the ICTY Trial Chamber:
[t]he "population" element is intended to imply crimes of a
collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts ....
Thus the emphasis is not on the individual victim but rather
on the collective, the individual being victimized not because
of his individual attributes but rather because of his member-
ship of a targeted civilian population. This has been inter-
preted to mean, as elaborated below, that the acts must occur
on a widespread or systematic basis, that there must be some
form of a governmental, organizational or group policy to
commit these acts and that the perpetrator must know of the
context within which his actions are taken, as well as the re-
quirement . . . that the actions be taken on discriminatory
grounds.1 6
4
The above paragraph and the structure of the opinion made it
clear that the ICTY Trial Chamber viewed the term "population"
as having three essential components: "widespread or system-
atic" commission of the acts that constitute crimes against hu-
161. Id. 1 635.
162. Id. 1 636.
163. Id. 1 638.
164. Id. 11 636-41.
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manity; a discriminatory motive for those acts; and a governmen-
tal, organizational, or group policy to commit those acts.
As noted earlier, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Nikolic
Rule 61 Decision had already taken the approach of reading
"widespread" and "systematic" criteria as a component of "any
civilian population.' 1 65  Here, the IC[Y Trial Chamber con-
firmed that these conditions existed in the alternative and that
" [e] ither one of these is sufficient to exclude isolated or random
acts."'1 6 6 The ICTY Trial Chamber observed that the U.N. Secre-
tary-General's Report, Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision, and
the 1996 ILC Draft Code also treated these conditions as alterna-
tives. The Tadic Judgment did not elaborate on how to construe
"widespread" or "systematic," but it cited the relevant portions of
the ILC's comments to Article 18 in the 1996 Draft Code.'6 7 Fi-
nally, the ICTY Trial Chamber affirmed that a single act commit-
ted in the context of a widespread or systematic attack could
constitute a crime against humanity.
168
With regard to the requirement of a discriminatory motive,
the ICTY Trial Chamber conceded that the "law in this area is
mixed.'1 69 Although the opinion cited several sources that re-
ject the need for establishing discriminatory intent and noted
that the ICTY Statute itself does not include this element, the
ICTY Trial Chamber ultimately imposed this requirement be-
cause it had been raised in the Secretary-General Report and
"since several Security Council members stated that they inter-
preted Article 5 as referring to acts taken on a discriminatory
basis."'7 0 France, the United States, and Russia were the states
that supported the inclusion of a discriminatory motive.' 7 '
Turning to the final component of "population," the ICTY
Trial Chamber required that there be "some form of policy to
commit these acts."' 7 2 This approach is somewhat puzzling be-
cause the inquiry into systemacity, one alternative in the first
component of "population," already addresses the issue of
165. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
166. TadicJudgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Oct. 2, 1995).
167. Id. 1 648 (1997); see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
168. Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 648.
169. Id. 650.
170. Id. 652.
171. Id.
172. Id. 653.
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whether or not an action was taken pursuant to a policy.173 If
the "policy element" is treated here as a separate component,
then even when the first element of "population" has been estab-
lished by demonstrating that inhumane acts were committed on
a widespread basis, there would still be a need to show the exist-
ence of a policy to commit such acts. The ICTY Trial Chamber,
however, then went on to say that the policy does not have to be
explicit, but can be inferred. 174 If the "policy" component can
simply be established by the fulfillment of either alternative of
the first condition, then it would appear not to be an additional
element at all.
The formulation of the policy requirement is also unfortu-
nate because of the necessary specificity of the requisite policy.
A general policy of ethnic cleansing, as was present in the former
Yugoslavia, does not appear to be sufficient under the ICTY Trial
Chamber's formulation because there must be a "policy to com-
mit these acts." Thus, it appears that within the general policy of
ethnic cleansing there would also need to be a specific policy to
commit murder, rape, torture, and so forth. The ICTY Trial
Chamber, however, does not address this point because of its
willingness to infer the existence of a policy from evidence of the
widespread or systematic commission of such acts.
In the subsequent paragraph, the ICTY Trial Chamber
notes that the "policy" element raises another issue, that is, the
"nature of the entity behind the policy. ' 175 It is here that this
component adds an additional requirement, the need for the
acts to be committed pursuant to a policy of a state or of "forces
which, although not those of the legitimate government, have de
facto control over, or are able to move freely within defined terri-
tory. ' 1 76 The ICTY Trial Chamber cited with approval the for-
mulation in the ILC 1996 Draft Code, which referred to a "gov-
ernment or any organization or group."1 77 Although the ICTY
Trial Chamber failed to elaborate further on what sorts of enti-
ties may fall into this category, it cited the observation of the
173. Id. 648.
174. "Notably, if the acts occur on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates
a policy to commit those acts, Whether formalized or not." Tadic Judgment, Case No.
IT-94-1-T, 653 (May 7, 1997) (emphasis added).
175. Id. 654.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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1991 1LC Report that "private individuals with de facto power or
organized in criminal gangs or groups might also commit" sys-
tematic or mass violations of human rights.
178
Finally, with regard to the requisite mental element for
crimes against humanity, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted that
there are two components. First, the accused must know of the
broader context in which he commits his acts. 179 While the Finta
decision articulated a similar mental element by requiring the
accused to have knowledge of the "facts or circumstances which
would bring his or her acts within crimes against humanity, 
°180
the ICTY Trial Chamber elaborated on this further by explain-
ing that the perpetrator must have "knowledge, either actual or
constructive, that these acts were occurring on a widespread or
systematic basis."'' Secondly, the Trial Chamber ruled that the
accused cannot commit any crimes against humanity for purely
personal reasons.'8 2 It offered as an example a case arising
under German penal law in 1948, where a man had denounced
his wife for being pro-Jewish and anti-Nazi.1 8 3 Although there
were personal motivations behind the denunciation, the ICTY
Trial Chamber noted that he had nevertheless been convicted of
a crime against humanity because "his behavior fitted into the
plan of persecution against Jews in Germany.' '1 84
In sum, the Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction established early
on that a nexus between crimes against humanity and armed
conflict, while required by the ICTY Statute, did not reflect con-
temporary international law. This position was reaffirmed by the
Nikolic Rule 61 Decision, the Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Deci-
sion, and the Tadic Judgment. The Vukovar Hospital Rule 61
Decision is also significant because it began to apply the "wide-
spread" and "systematic" criteria, elements that had been identi-
fied in the Secretary-General and Commission reports and
briefly raised in the Nikolic Rule 61 Decision. The Vukovar Hos-
pital Rule 61 Decision was also the first opinion by the ICTY to
178. Id. 654-55.
179. TadicJudgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997).
180. Id.
181. Id. 659.
182. Id.
183. Id. 658 (citing Obersten Gerichtshofes, Decision of the District Court
(Landgericht) Hamburg of 11 Nov. 1948, STS 78/48, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen II,
1945-66, 491, 499 (unofficial translation)).
184. Id.
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affirm that the term "civilian" could apply to individuals who
were not strictly non-combatants, a position that was taken by the
Commission and later re-affirmed by the Tadic Judgment.18 5
The Tadic Judgment noted three elements of the term
"population." The ICTY Trial Chamber's first required the
"widespread or systematic" commission of acts of crimes against
humanity, applying these criteria as alternatives and not cumula-
tively." 6 Second, the ICTY Trial Chamber required a discrimi-
natory motive, citing the intent of the Security Council as a dis-
positive factor.18 7 Finally, there needed to be a governmental,
organizational, or group policy to commit inhumane acts,
although the ICTY Trial Chamber was willing to infer the exist-
ence of such a policy from the widespread or systematic commis-
sion of those acts. 88 In clarifying the requisite mental state, the
ICTY Trial Chamber noted that the defendant must have knowl-
edge that his acts took place within the context of a widespread
or systematic attack. 8 '
III. THE STATUS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIOR TO THE
ROME CONFERENCE
Article 38 of the Statute for the International Court of Jus-
tice'9° ("ICJ Statute") recognizes four sources of international
law: "1) international conventions, whether general or particu-
lar ... ; 2) international custom, as evidence of a general prac-
tice accepted as law; 3) the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; 4) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists." '191 In examining the di-
verse treatment of the elements of crimes against humanity by
the bodies discussed in Parts I and II, and in weighing the rela-
tive authority of these various interpretations, it is important to
185. Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, Case No.
IT-95-13-R61 (Apr. 3, 1996), Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Trial Chamber.
186. Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (1945).
191. Id. art. 38(1), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans 1224.
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keep in mind the hierarchy of the sources of law that has been
established by the ICJ Statute.
The scope of crimes against humanity is difficult to deter-
mine precisely at any given point in time because of the absence
of a specialized convention on this crime. 92 Nevertheless, evi-
dence of one aspect of the definition-the deletion of the nexus
between crimes against humanity and armed conflict-can be
found in the Genocide Convention, a treaty defining a particular
crime that constitutes a crime against humanity. More generally,
the Convention on Statutory Limitations applies to crimes
against humanity "whether committed in time of war or in time
of peace."' 95  While the ICTY Statute incorporates the require-
ment of a nexus with armed conflict," 4 the ICTY itself has re-
peatedly stated in the Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction and subse-
quent decisions that this restriction is intended to limit the juris-
diction of the ICTY, not to reflect contemporary international
law.19
5
The development of international law regarding the need
for a discriminatory motive in crimes against humanity has been
uneven and confused. The structure of the Nuremberg Charter
definition, and its subsequent interpretation by the ILC and the
U.N. Secretary-General in 1949, strongly suggested that the
grounds for discrimination applied only to the crime of persecu-
tion and not to the definition of crimes against humanity as a
whole. On the other hand, recent national law decisions on
crimes against humanity have understood a discriminatory mo-
tive to be a requisite element; notably, the Finta court in Canada
required that crimes against humanity be committed according
to a State policy of discrimination. Moreover, the requirement
of a discriminatory motive was incorporated by the Security
Council, either explicitly or implicitly, into the ICTY Statute and
ICTR Statute, affirmed by the U.N. Secretary-General and the
Commission, and applied by the ICTY.
The interpretations of the ILC can be considered authorita-
tive because the U.N. General Assembly gave this body a man-
192. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a Specialized Conven-
tion, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994).
193. Convention on Statutory Limitations, supra note 27, art. 1(b).
194. ICTY Statute, supra note 6.
195. Tadic Decision onJurisdiction, IT-94-I-AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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date to formulate principles of international criminal law.1 96 It is
questionable, however, what weight should be given to the re-
ports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations or by the
Commission. With regard to the latter body, it is important to
note that the Commission's initial mandate, as defined by the
Security Council, was only to "examine and analyze the informa-
tion submitted [by States and humanitarian organizations] ...
with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclu-
sions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions and other violations of international humanitarian law."1 97
Clearly, the Security Council did not envision that the Commis-
sion would provide an authoritative legal interpretation of the
crimes identified in the ICTY Statute. This was also explicitly
recognized by the Commission, which stated in its report that
the "Commission's mandate is to provide the Secretary-General
with its conclusions on the evidence of such violations and not to
provide an analysis of the legal issues."'98 Despite the questionable
authority of the Commission's report, the ICTY in the Vukovar
Hospital Rule 61 Decision and the TadicJudgment relied heavily
on the Commission's Report to argue that the term "any civilian
population" does not apply strictly to non-combatants.
The decisions of the ICTY constitute an important source of
international law, not only as judicial decisions but also as deci-
sions of an international tribunal. In the Tadic Judgment, the
ICTY applied the requirement of a discriminatory motive be-
cause this requirement had been the understanding of the Se-
curity Council.' 99 The views of the Security Council members
carry weight both because the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals
were established under its authority, and also because the ex-
pression of such views constitute state practice, which contrib-
utes to customary international law.z ° °
The acceptance of the requirement of a discriminatory mo-
tive by the national courts of France and Canada may also consti-
tute either evidence of customary international law or of the
196. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
197. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780
(1992).
198. Commission of Experts'Report, supra note 130, 41 (emphasis added).
199. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 (1996) (noting that state
practice includes diplomatic acts and official statements).
DEFINING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
principles of municipal law recognized by civilized nations. 20 1 It
is important to note, however, that a "significant minority of ju-
rists holds that national law principles, even if generally found in
most legal systems, cannot ipso facto be international law. 20 2
The concerns about incorporating national legal principles di-
rectly into international law are even more salient when the
motivations behind a national court's interpretation of a legal
principle may be suspect, as has been suggested with regard to
the French courts' interpretation of crimes against humanity.203
The relevance of national court decisions for reflecting the
development of crimes against humanity in contemporary inter-
national law is also greatly diminished by the fact that these
courts were invariably punishing acts that occurred during
World War II, not acts that occurred in recent years. To avoid
applying an ex post facto criminal norm, the courts thus had to
apply the definition of crimes against humanity as it existed and
was understood fifty years ago, rather than the "current" defini-
tion of crimes against humanity, whatever that may be. 20 4
The elimination of the nexus with armed conflict in recent
international law gave rise to two concerns about the definition
of crimes against humanity: first, how to exclude isolated acts
from crimes against humanity; and second, how to distinguish
an ordinary crime from one that rises to the level of interna-
tional concern. Thus, it is no coincidence that the cases discuss-
ing Control Council Law No. 10, which applied a definition of
crimes against humanity that de-linked these crimes from crimes
against peace and war crimes, also restricted its application to
the systematic commission of State-sponsored acts.20 5 Similarly,
the 1954 Draft Code definition, which removed the nexus with
armed conflict, was also the first formulation by the ILC to incor-
porate a requirement of State involvement in crimes against hu-
201. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT 47-48 (1996) (citing OSCAR SCHACrER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 5 (1991)).
202. Id.
203. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
204. Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth, (1991) 1 I.L.R. 3, 68 (Aust.) (stating
that there is "moral tension ... between a desire to ensure that fundamental justice is
not avoided by an overly technical scrutiny and a fundamental objection to individuals
being called to account by victors in a war according to laws which did not exist at the
time.").
205. See Lippman, supra note 8.
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manity, either by commission, instigation, or toleration. 20 6
In response to the first concern, of excluding isolated and
random acts, the solution has been to impose a criteria of the
"widespread or systematic" commission of these acts. The crite-
ria of "systematic" was first raised by the U.S. courts under Con-
trol Council Law No. 10 and then also applied by the French
courts in the Barbie and Touvierjudgments. 20 7 The terms "mass
scale" or "widespread" were subsequently added by the U.N. Sec-
retary-General and the Commission in their reports.208 The de-
cisions of the ICTY imposed a uniformity in the language, by
using the terms "widespread" and "systematic" and clarifying that
these criteria existed as alternatives. 20 9 The gradual and consis-
tent application of these elements by national and international
tribunals, coupled with the ILC's inclusion of these elements in
the 1996 Draft Code, demonstrates that contemporary interna-
tional law requires that crimes against humanity be committed
on a "widespread or systematic" basis.210
The incorporation of a State action and, later, a State policy
element in the definition of crimes against humanity is more
problematic. In 1954, the ILC merely required government in-
stigation or tolerance of a crimes against humanity.211 In the
intervening decades when the ILC suspended consideration of
the Draft Code, national courts were left to interpret crimes
against humanity. 21 2 This suspension proved to be troubling be-
cause national interests may have prompted the courts to define
the crime too narrowly. Thus, the national courts not only intro-
duced a policy requirement, but also further imposed a require-
206. See 1954 ILC Draft Code, supra note 46.
207. Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes and
Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 124, 137 (1988) (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber
1983-85); Prosecutor v. Touvier, 100 I.L.R. 341, 358 (1992) (Court of Cassation, Crimi-
nal Chamber 1992).
208. 1991 ILC Report, supra note 50; Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Report]; Secretary-General Report, supra note 127.
209. Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Dragan
Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61 (1995), Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, Trial Chamber.
210. 1996 ILC Report, supra note 56.
211. 1954 ILC Draft Code, supra note 46.
212. 1991 ILC Report, supra note 50; 1994 ILC Report, supra note 208; Secretary-Gen-
eral Report, supra note 127.
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ment for specific types of policy. The Commission adopted the
Finta court's requirement of a policy of discrimination or perse-
cution.
The 1996 ILC Draft Code, however, treated "policy" as an
indicator of "systematic" and required State, organizational or
group involvement to be evidenced by instigation or direction.
The Tadic Judgment in the next year followed a similar ap-
proach.2 13 Although the ICTY appears at first to require a sepa-
rate showing of policy, in addition to the "widespread" or "sys-
tematic" criteria, a closer examination reveals that the ICTY was
willing to infer the "policy" element from the establishment of
either the "widespread" or "systematic" criteria. The significance
of the "policy" element appears to lie in its examination of the
"nature of the entity behind the policy." Thus, the 1996 Draft
Code and the 1997 Tadic Judgment have a two-fold importance:
in adding organizations and groups as entities that may be liable
for crimes against humanity, and in casting doubt as to whether
international law requires a showing of "policy" as an additional
element of establishing crimes against humanity.
IV. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DRAFI- STATUTE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1994_1998)214
Prompted by Trinidad and Tobago, whose government was
keen on establishing a permanent International Criminal Court
to prosecute narcotics trafficking crimes, ,the U.N. General As-
sembly passed a resolution in 1992, requesting the ILC to draft a
statute for such a court.21 5 In September 1994, the ILC submit-
ted the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court2 16
("Draft ICC Statute") to the General Assembly. Article 20(d) of
the Draft ICC Statute listed crimes against humanity as one of
213. Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-I-AR92.
214. For a comprehensive history of the drafting of and negotiations on the draft
ICC Statute, see Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 177
(1997) [hereinafter Hall 1]; Christopher Keith Hall, The Third and Fourth Sessions of the
UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 124 (1998) [hereinafter Hall 2]; and Christopher Keith Hall, The Fifth Session of
the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM.
J. INT'L L. 331 (1998) [hereinafter Hall 3].
215. G.A. Res. 47/33, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/33 (1992).
216. 1994 ILC Report, supra note 208.
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the "Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.'"217 The Gen-
eral Assembly subsequently authorized the creation of an Ad
Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court ("Ad Hoc Committee") to review the substantive and
administrative issues arising out of the Draft ICC statute.21 8
The Ad Hoc Committee convened two sessions in 1995,
from April 3 to 13 and from August 14 to 25. During the Ad hoc
Committee discussions on crimes against humanity, delegates
emphasized that the ICC's jurisdiction should be limited to seri-
ous crimes rather than isolated offenses. Accordingly, some
delegations expressed the view that elements such as a nexus to
armed conflict and criteria referring the "widespread or system-
atic" nature of the crimes should be included in the definition of
crimes against humanity. Others recognized that crimes against
humanity "could be committed against any civilian population"
and argued that the inclusion of a discriminatory motive was
"questionable and unnecessary. "219
Following the submission of the Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court2 20 ("Ad Hoc Committee Report"), the U.N. General As-
sembly determined that further review of the draft ICC Statute
was necessary and established the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court ("Preparatory
Committee"). In 1996, the Preparatory Committee met from
March 25 to April 12 and from August 12 to 30. The Preparatory
Committee's 1996 Report contained nine different proposals for
crimes against humanity, in addition to the Chairman's informal
text.2 2 1 There continued to be disagreement over the necessity
of a nexus with armed conflict or of a discriminatory motive.
While generally supporting the inclusion of the "widespread or
systematic" criteria, delegations had various views on what the
terms would entail. Some of the suggested components for
"widespread or systematic" included: an element of planning,
217. Id. art. 20(d).
218. G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 137, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/49/53 (1994).
219. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, 77-79, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
220. Id.
221. Report of the Preparatoiy Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22A, Vol. 2, 65-70, U.N. Doc. A/51/22
(1996).
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policy, or conspiracy; a multiplicity of victims or a massive scale
of violations; and consent of the government or of the party in
charge of the territory.222
At the end of 1996, the U.N. General Assembly renewed the
mandate of the Preparatory Committee for four more sessions,
with the last one held in the spring of 1998.223 The third session
of the Preparatory Committee, held from February 11 to 21, in-
cluded a working group on the definition of crimes. The criteria
of "widespread or systematic" in the definition of crimes against
humanity continued to be a point of contention, with the debate
extending to whether the conditions should be viewed as alter-
natives or cumulative. 224 There was also ongoing disagreement
over whether a nexus to armed conflict and a discriminatory mo-
tive needed to be included. The definition of crimes against hu-
manity that emerged from this Preparatory Committee session
contained the following chapeau in the first paragraph:
For the purpose of the present Statute, any of the following
acts constitutes a crime against humanity when committed [as
part of a widespread and/or systematic commission of such
acts against any population]: as part of a widespread and/or
systematic commission of such acts against any [civilian] pop-
ulation [committed on a massive scale in armed conflict on
political, philosophical, racial, ethnic or religious grounds or
any other arbitrarily defined grounds]225
The second paragraph defined each of the acts listed in the first
222. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22A, Vol. 1, 21-24 U.N. Doc. A/51/22
(1996).
223. G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 342, U.N. Doc. A/
51/49 (1996).
224. Hall 2, supra note 214, at 126-27 (1998). Christopher Hall explained that
there was:
considerable disagreement on the scale or gravity of the offenses to be in-
cluded in the ICC'sjurisdiction .... According to some states, the ICC should
have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity only when the acts were both
widespread and systematic. A larger number of states, however, argued that
this requirement would unduly restrict the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction and
urged that the ICC have jurisdiction when the acts were either widespread or
systematic.
Id.
225. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held from 11 to
21 February 1997, Annex I: Report of the Working Group on the Definition of Crimes,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5, at 4 (1997).
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paragraph that may constitute crimes against humanity.226
The definition of crimes against humanity was not taken up
again in any of the subsequent Preparatory Committee sessions
that preceded the Rome Conference. A minor revision was
made to the text during an intersessional meeting convened in
Zutphen, the Netherlands, inJanuary 1998.227 The Zutphen text
modified the opening clause of the "crimes against humanity"
chapeau, for consistency with opening clauses of the definitions
for the other crimes, to read: "For the purpose of the present
Statute, a crime against humanity means any of the following
acts when committed .... ,,22' The Zutphen revision and the
remainder of the February 1997 Preparatory Committee text on
crimes against humanity served as the basis for negotiations in
the Rome Conference.
229
V. ROME CONFERENCE
Pursuant to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 52/160,230
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
("Rome Conference") was held in Rome from June 15 to July 17,
1998.231 There were at least three levels of negotiations and de-
cision-making at the Rome Conference. The Committee of the
Whole initially served as the forum where government delega-
tions expressed their general positions on issues such as the defi-
nitions of crimes and the preconditions to the exercise of the
ICC's jurisdiction. Debate on the details of the provisions took
place in Working Groups, which were organized according to
the component parts of the statute. As the Rome Conference
continued, the Committee of the Whole convened less fre-
226. Id. at 5.
227. The Zutphen session, convened by the Chairman of the Preparatory Commit-
tee, Adrian Bos, and attended by the members of the Bureau, Chairs of different Work-
ing Groups, Coordinators and the Secretariat, did not make substantive changes but
only made slight editorial modifications "for the purposes of consistency or of reflect-
ing discussions in the Preparatory Committee." Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting From
19 to 30January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, at 8-9
(1998).
228. Id. at 33.
229. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/
Add.1 (1998).
230. G.A. Res. 52/160, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/52/160 (1997).
231. Id.
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quently, meeting only to approve text generated by the working
groups and to forward such text to the drafting committee. Fi-
nally, informal sessions were often convened to deal with partic-
ularly contentious issues on which the working groups could not
achieve consensus. 23
2
A. Preliminary Discussions on Crimes Against Humanity
The definition of crimes against humanity was discussed in
the Committee of the Whole on the morning of June 17.23
Aside from the diverse views on which acts may be considered
crimes against humanity,234 the debate centered primarily on
two issues. First, while many countries expressed the view that
crimes against humanity can be committed in times of peace,
other states insisted on a nexus with armed conflict. Certain
delegations even went so far as to state that crimes against hu-
manity should only be limited to acts occurring in armed con-
flicts of an international nature.23 5
Second, there was considerable disagreement over whether
the criteria of "widespread" and "systematic" should be treated
cumulatively or as alternatives, that is, whether the two words
should be connected by an "and" or an "or." One delegate pro-
posed the deletion of "widespread," noting that this term would
be difficult to apply. Another issue raised by the French dele-
gate was whether the definition should include the requirement
of a discriminatory motive. Only three delegates addressed this
proposal, however, and they all opposed it. In summing up the
morning's debate, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole
also failed to mention the French proposal.23 6
The next debate on crimes against humanity took place in
the working groups, which convened on the morning ofJune 22.
The issues relating to the "widespread" and "systematic" criteria
emerged as the primary source of contention, with debate con-
232. See Rules of Procedure for the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentia-
ries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/6
(1998).
233. Author's notes on the Proceedings of the Rome Conference (une 17, 1998)
(on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) [hereinafter Notes].
234. Another related issue was whether the enumerated acts should be defined
within the article.
235. Notes, supra note 233 (June 17, 1998).
236. Id.
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tinuing on whether "and" or "or" should be used to connect the
two terms. Two states continued to propose the deletion of
"widespread." Discussion also turned to the meaning of the
terms. Emphasizing the need to exclude isolated incidents, dele-
gations generally interpreted "widespread" to indicate a "multi-
plicity of persons" or a "massive" attack. With regard to "system-
atic," delegates noted that this indicates some degree of plan-
ning, pattern, coordinated activity, or scheme. The U.S.
delegate proposed that systematic should be defined as an "at-
tack that constitutes or is part of, or in furtherance of, a precon-
ceived plan or policy, or repeated practice over a period of
time. "237
Although a near consensus had been reached on the exclu-
sion of a nexus between crimes against humanity and armed
conflict, China, later joined by Turkey, continued to insist upon
such a link. France conceded defeat on the inclusion of a dis-
criminatory motive in the definition, noting that although "it was
important to include these grounds in the chapeau as it was part
of its legal tradition, ... other states did not support it on this
point. '23' The debate on the inclusion of a reference to "civilian
population" focused on whether non-combatants should be the
only victims of crimes against humanity. Finally, the United
Kingdom raised the point that planning by a government or or-
ganization should be an additional criteria.
In sum, the principle issues that emerged during the Com-
mittee of the Whole and working group discussions on crimes
against humanity were the requirement of a nexus between
crimes against humanity and armed conflict, and the treatment
of "widespread" and "systematic" as either alternative or cumula-
tive criteria. Attempts were also made to define "widespread"
and "systematic." The requirement of a discriminatory motive in
the chapeau of crimes against humanity was quickly dropped
when it became apparent early on that there was virtual no sup-
port for its inclusion. The very limited discussion of "civilian
population" failed to reflect the complex analysis that the ICTY
had undertaken for this term.
237. NGO COALITION FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (DEFINITIONS
TEAM), INFORMAL REPORT OFJUNE 23, 1998 (1998) (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
238. Id.
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B. The Canadian Proposal for the Chapeau to Crimes
Against Humanity
On July 1, the Canadian delegation introduced a compro-
mise proposal for the chapeau to crimes against humanity,
aimed at meeting the concerns of those countries who wanted
"widespread" and "systematic" to be treated as cumulative crite-
ria. The Canadian chapeau read as follows:
(1) For the purpose of the present Statute, a crime against
humanity means any of the following acts when knowingly
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population ....
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) "attack against any
civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the
commission of multiple acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or knowingly in
furtherance of a governmental or organizational policy to
commit those acts. 23 9
Canada also issued a Background Paper on Some Jurisprudence
on Crimes Against Humanity in support of its proposal. Citing the
Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction, the paper affirmed that custom-
ary law no longer required crimes against humanity to be linked
with armed conflict. It referred to the Tadic Judgment to argue
that "widespread" and "systematic" should be treated as alterna-
tives and that the definition should require a showing of govern-
mental, organizational, or group policy. Finally, the paper em-
phasized that a single crime can constitute a crime against hu-
manity if it was committed as part of a attack, relying on the
Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision and the Tadic Judgment.24 °
1. Government Responses to Canadian Proposal
In the informal session conducted on the Canadian propo-
sal in the morning ofJuly 1, some delegates continued to express
their preference for "widespread and systematic" and China
seemed unwilling to give up on the nexus with armed conflict.241
The introduction of the definition of "attack against any civilian
239. CANADIAN DELEGATION, BACKGROUND PAPER ON SOME JURISPRUDENCE ON
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (July 1, 1998) [hereinafter CANADIAN PROPOSAL] (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
240. Id.
241. Notes, supra note 233 (July 1, 1998).
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population" attracted a broad range of comments. Some dele-
gates expressed the view that the "commission of multiple acts"
language was sufficient to exclude isolated acts from the defini-
tion as crimes against humanity, while others felt this term was
still not enough to ensure that only acts committed on a massive
scale would be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. 242 The
U.K. delegate also suggested that "multiple commission of acts"
would be more appropriate than "multiple acts. '"243
As for the reference to "policy" in paragraph 2(1) of this
paper, Costa Rica raised concerns about the difficulties in estab-
lishing policy.244 The Swiss delegate observed that the proposal,
which refers to a "governmental or organizational policy," did
not track the language of the TadicJudgment, which referred to
policies by a government, organization, or group.245 Finally,
there was some confusion about the significance of the word
"knowingly."246
A working group session on crimes against humanity met on
the morning of July 3. The discussion of the chapeau, however,
was limited and did not raise any new points. The Chair of the
working group adopted the chapeau as it stood, noting that
some delegations had problems with "knowingly" and "multiple
acts." The remainder of the session was devoted to a discussion
of the enumerated acts.2 4 7
2. Non-Governmental Organization Responses to the
Canadian Proposal
The Canadian proposal was also strongly criticized by non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") observing the Rome Con-
ference. 248 While welcoming the treatment of "widespread" and
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. The text of crimes against humanity submitted to the Committee of the
Whole is contained in Article 5: Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court. COMMIT-
TEE OF THE WHOLE, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/L.44 (1992).
248. See THE SOUTH ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTER, THE NORTH
AMERICAN RE-WRITE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN "AND" BY ANY OTHER NAME Is
STILL AN "AND" (July 2, 1998) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [here-
inafter SAHRDC Paper]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COMMENTS ON THE CANADIAN PROPO-
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"systematic" as alternative criteria in paragraph 1, NGOs viewed
the explanatory definition of "attack directed against any civilian
population" in the second paragraph as an ill-disguised attempt
to reintroduce these criteria as cumulative. As argued by the
South Asian Human Rights Documentation Center, the prosecu-
tor "must still prove that the attack against the civilian popula-
tion was 'widespread' (involving multiple acts) and 'systematic'
(pursuant to or knowingly in furtherance of a policy). "24§ A re-
lated point of concern was that the requirement of a "policy"
would make it more difficult to establish "systematicity." One
NGO stated, "While systematic has an established meaning in in-
ternational law and can be demonstrated by a pattern of official
actions or tolerance of abuse, 'governmental or organizational
policy' may be susceptible to a narrower interpretation, such as a
showing of affirmative and formal administrative acts."250
There were also strong objections to the double knowledge
requirement contained in the Canadian proposal. Not only did
the perpetrator have to "knowingly commit [acts] as part of a
widespread or systematic attack," as set forth in paragraph 1, but
the second paragraph further requires that the attack must be
committed "pursuant to or knowingly in furtherance of a gov-
ernmental or organizational policy. ' 251 The second knowledge
requirement is problematic because it is ambiguous as to whom
it should be imputed. If it applies to those participating in the
attack, "then the prosecutor would have to prove the intent of
third parties with respect to the policy behind the attack in order
to secure a conviction for crimes against humanity."252 More-
over, if the knowledge requirement applies to the perpetrator,
then this requirement clearly exceeds the language of the Tadic
Judgment, which only required the defendant to have "knowl-
edge, either actual or constructive, that these acts were occur-
ring on a widespread or systematic basis." 25 ' Also, legal com-
mentators have generally rejected such a high knowledge re-
quirement:
SAL ON CHAPEAU TO CRIMES AGAINST HuMANiTy (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) [hereinafter HRW Comments].
249. SAHRDC Paper, supra note 248.
250. HRW Comments, supra note 248.
251. CANADIAN PROPOSAL, supra note 239.
252. SAHRDC Paper, supra note 248.
253. Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 659 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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Public officials acting in furtherance of "state action or pol-
icy" do not, however, need to know that they are part of an
overall scheme or design, nor do they need to know the spe-
cifics of the overall scheme or design beyond their own role if
they know that their conduct is illegal or that the orders
under which they are acting are manifestly illegal.25 4
Two other problems with the Canadian proposal are worth
noting. The term "commission of multiple acts referred to in
paragraph 11"255 is troubling because it allows for the misinterpre-
tation that the commission of murders is insufficient to qualify as
an attack, but that murders have to be committed in conjunction
with other inhumane acts such as torture or enslavement. Addi-
tionally, as noted above in the discussion of the TadicJudgment,
the requirement of a "policy to commit those acts" suggests that
a general policy of suppression would be insufficient for the pur-
poses of this definition; rather, there must be a policy to commit
specific acts.
C. The Final Definition
On July 6, the Bureau of the Committee of the Hole re-
leased a Discussion Paper containing a compromise proposal for
some of the more contentious aspects of the Draft ICC Statute,
including the definitions of crimes, the preconditions to the ex-
ercise ofjurisdiction, and the role of the prosecutor.2 56 The cha-
peau to the definition of crimes against humanity in paragraph 1
and the relevant explanatory note in paragraph 2 read as fol-
lows:
(1) For the purpose of the present Statute, a crime against
humanity means any of the following acts when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population and with knowledge of the attack.
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) "attack against any
civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance
of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.
254. BASSIOUNI, supra note 8, at 256.
255. CANADIAN PROPOSAL, supra note 239.
256. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, Discussion Paper, United Nations Diplomatic Confer-
ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.183/C.1/L.53, at 2-3 (July 6, 1998).
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This definition contains four substantive modifications.257
First, the phrase "multiple commission of acts" replaces "com-
mission of multiple acts." Second, the Discussion Paper deletes
the second knowledge requirement previously contained in par-
agraph 2. Third, the requisite policy is no longer a policy to
commit the acts, but a "policy to commit such an attack." Fi-
nally, the relevant entity behind the policy is the State, not the
government.
Although the Committee of the Whole examined the Dis-
cussion Paper, there was no extensive debate on crimes against
humanity, given the highly politicized and controversial nature
of the other issues in that paper. The subsequent Bureau Propo-
sal distributed on July 10 contained no further changes.25" Ex-
cept for a minor grammatical revision, substituting the final
"and" in paragraph 1 with a comma, the Discussion Paper's for-
mulation of the chapeau and its explanatory note ywas thus incor-
porated as Article 7 of the Rome Statute.259
CONCLUSION
As can be said of much of the Rome Statute, the definition
of crimes against humanity in Article 7 gives cause for celebra-
tion in certain respects and continued vigilance or possible con-
cern in others. The elimination of the connection between
armed conflict and crimes against humanity accurately reflects
the current state of international law, which rejected the need
for such a nexus as early as 1954, as expressed by the ILC.
Although the ICTY Statute does require a link with armed con-
flict, this requirement has been resoundingly interpreted in the
decisions emerging from the ICTY as a restriction on the ICTY's
257. A fifth modification that does not change the substance of the chapeau is that
the words "knowingly committed as part of a[n] .. .attack" in the Canadian proposal
are replaced in the Committee of the Whole Discussion Paper, United Nations Diplo-
matic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court ("Discussion Paper") by the phrase "committed ... with knowledge of the
attack."
258. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, Bureau Proposal, United Nations Diplomatic Confer-
ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.183/C.1/L.59, at 2-3 (1998).
259. ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 7. Article 7 also differed from the Bureau
Proposal in other aspects of the definition of crimes against humanity, with regard to
the addition of rape and other forms of sexual violence among the enumerated acts,
the order of the definitions in paragraph 2, the addition of the definition of enforced
pregnancy, and the addition of the definition of gender. Id.
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jurisdiction rather than a restriction in the definition of crimes
against humanity itself.
While the need for a discriminatory motive has been un-
clear, recent developments in international law, particularly with
regard to the ICTY, reveal a growing acceptance of this element.
It was therefore surprising that the deletion of this requirement
was relatively uncontroversial in Rome. Nevertheless, this out-
come is certainly welcome. The requirement lacks textual basis,
not only historically, but also because it conflicts with the recog-
nition of "any civilian population" as the relevant group of pro-
tected persons by allowing only certain groups to claim that they
have suffered crimes against humanity.
The Rome Statute appropriately treats the "widespread" or
"systematic" criteria as alternative elements, following the prac-
tice of the ILC and the ICTY. The explanatory note to para-
graph 1, however, potentially undermines the alternative nature
of these criteria by requiring the "multiple commission of acts
... pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such an attack."26" The term "multiple com-
mission of acts" is novel because the word "attack" has never
been interpreted before in the decades of jurisprudence on
crimes against humanity. It imposes a slightly higher threshold
than that required by "widespread" because the latter can simply
involve a quantitative inquiry into the multiplicity of the victims,
and not of the acts. Indeed, the ILC noted in 1996 that the
"widespread" criteria could be fulfilled by the "singular effect of
an inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude. ' 261 While the
"multiple commission of acts" element thus adds a new compo-
nent to the definition of crimes against humanity, it is important
to keep in mind the observation of the Indian delegate that "any-
thing more than one could be multiple."262 Thus, the additional
burden is not unduly onerous.
The need to establish a "State or organizational policy" is
problematic because this requirement would appear to establish
a higher threshold than that which is required to establish sys-
tematicity. As noted by the ILC in 1996 and affirmed by the
ICTY in the Tadic Judgment, systematicity can be demonstrated
260. CANADIAN PROPOSAL, supra note 239.
261. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
262. Notes, supra note 233 (July, 1 1998).
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by a plan, which may be less explicit and formalized than a pol-
icy. To require a demonstration of a policy on top of the estab-
lishment of either the "widespread" or "systematic" criteria is
even more troubling because it, in effect, treats the latter two
criteria as cumulative. The ILC and the ICTY clearly retreated
from this approach, despite the interpretations by national
courts that required a State policy as an element of crimes
against humanity. Rather than talking about a "policy," the ILC
in its 1996 Draft Code noted the need for instigation or direc-
tion by a government, organization, or group. While the ICTY
did refer to policy in the Tadic Judgment, it mitigated the poten-
tial dangers of the use of the word by emphasizing that such a
"policy need not be formalized and can be deduced from the
way in which the acts occur."2 6 3 Most importantly, the ICTY indi-
cated that it would infer the existence of a policy from the wide-
spread or systematic commission of acts.
In construing the "policy" requirement, the future ICC
should keep in mind that the importance of this element, as un-
derstood by the ILC and the ICTY, is not to demonstrate sys-
tematicity, but to establish some degree of State or organiza-
tional involvement in acts of crimes against humanity. Accord-
ingly, the ICC should follow the interpretation of the ICTY and
be willing to infer policy from the way acts are committed, rather
than insist upon proof of a formalized policy. This approach
would be consistent not only with contemporary international
law, but also with the intent of the delegates at the Rome Confer-
ence who clearly sought to incorporate the widespread and sys-
tematic criteria as alternative components. The Tadic Judgment
and its treatment of the policy element will have particular rele-
vance for interpreting the Rome Statute because the Canadian
proposal for the chapeau to crimes against humanity was justi-
fied on the basis of the ICTY's reasoning in this decision. More-
over, the decisions of the ICTY articulate principles of interna-
tional law that, according to Article 21 of the Rome Statute, may
be applied by the ICC. 26 4
As for other aspects of the "policy" requirement, Article 7
263. Tadic Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997).
264. ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 21(1) (b) (providing that "[t]he Court shall
apply... [iln the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the princi-
ples and rules of international law.").
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appropriately recognizes the relevant entity orchestrating the
policy can be either a state or an organization. International law
now recognizes that non-State actors may be subject to interna-
tional criminal liability. Although the definition fails to track the
terminology used by the ILC and the ICTY accurately, the differ-
ence between organizations and groups remain unclear. The
former term implies a greater degree of formality in its struc-
ture, but the impact, if any, of this omission on the prosecution
of crimes against humanity remains to be seen.
Finally, Article 7 defines the requisite policy as the "policy to
commit such an attack." This general formulation is an improve-
ment on the policies previously articulated by national courts or
the ICTY. Requiring the establishment of a specific, narrowly-
defined policy, such as a policy to impose political hegemony, to
discriminate, or to commit particular acts would have unduly
constrained the future ICC prosecutor in seeking justice for
crimes against humanity.
